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WHAT DOES ARISTOTLE'S PRIME MOVER DO?
(A discussion o f the theology o f Metaphysics Lambda!
by Sarah Broadie, Princeton University
SAGP meeting at the Marriott
Copley Place, Boston,
Bècem ber28, 1994
1. Introduction
Let us start by distinguishing two types o f noetic activity, one contemplative, one kinetic. The difference is
in intrinsic character or form. For now it is enough to specify die contemplative kind by contrast with the kinetic.
Contemplation is noësis that is not in itself geared to bring about change in or o f the physical universe. (This includes
changes in the subject so far as the subject has a physical dimension.) For a clear illustration, see Aristotle's account
o f theoretical activity in EM X. There it is stated that theorizing seeks nothing beyond itself (1177 b 19-20; cf. Meta.
982 b 20-28). Whatever the difference this activity essentially makes, the difference is not physical. Theoretical
activity may result, o f course, in a physical difference. Someone may find theorizing so ftilfilling that he takes
practical steps to create more opportunities for it, and the steps will involve some physical changes. But theôria is
not o f its own nature a source o f such change. Practical activity, by contrast, is a prime example of the kind o f noetic
activity which I term 'kinetic'. It not only gives rise to physical change, but aims to do so trader some description
(even though the practical significance o f an intended change may not be explicable in wholly physical terms).
The Prime Mover o f Metaphysics Lambda is the source, above all, of eternal motion in the first sphere. It may
seem silly to ask 'What (according to Lambda) does the Prime Mover do?' The answer is obvious: 'He — or it —
gives rise to the motion o f the first sphère'. But according to a widely accepted interpretation, this is not what the
Prime Mover does first and foremost; instead, the Mover essentially contemplates. This contemplative conception
is my target here. I shall adduce reasons for suspecting that the contemplative Prithe Mover is not an Aristotelian
postulate in Lambda, but an exegetical construct. I shall simultaneously make a case for holding that the actual Prime
Mover in Lambda should be viewed as a kinetic agent (which is how the Prime Mover is generally presented
elsewhere in the corpus1).
These arguments are founded on conceptual as well as textual considerations, and on reasonable assumptions
concerning Aristotle's aims in Lambda and his Capacity for self-criticism especially in respect o f absurdities for which
he castigates other philosophers. I shall not, however, rely on debatable hypotheses about the development of his
theology through several treatises, or about his journey towards or away from Platonism. I shall be concerned with
the Prime Mover only in Metaphysics Lambda, and within Lambda I shall restrict the discussion to relations that may
be thought to obtain between the Prime Mover, the first sphere, and the movement o f that sphere. And as well as
saying almost nothing about the other spheres and their movers, I shall touch only briefly on the celebrated doctrine
in Ch. 9 that the Prime Mover's activity is à thinking o f thinking.
Before launching into detailed discussion, let us note several requirements for a satisfactory interpretation o f
the Prime Mover theory in Lambda. It must do justice to Aristotle’s main objectives in the treatise, among them
these: (a) He wants to explain the eternal motion of the first heaven (this is taken as an established fact by the time
he turns to the Prime Mover), (b) He is therefore led to postulate as ultimate an eternal unitary cause of motion.
(This is by contrast with theories that postulate contrariety or some pair of contraries as the ultimate principle of
change in the universe.) (c) Since Aristotle maintains that the ultimate source of eternal motion must be an absolutely
changeless non-sensible substance, he is concerned to show that its metaphysical status is quite different from that of
a Platonic Form. (For one o f his recurring complaints against Platonism is that the Forms cannot explain movement
or any sort of change.) (d) Aristotle wants to maintain that something good - indeed, supremely good - is the ground
o f order in the universe, principally by being source of the eternal emotion that provides general conditions for all
other ongoing processes. More precisely, he wants to maintain that the supremely good being is the ground o f all else
primarily because it is good, and not because of any other attributes, even attributes closely bound up with its
goodness.
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In the light of requirements (a)-(c) we can see that Aristotle has reason to avoid any theory that wouldleave
it a mystery how the Prime Mover moves anything. And given (d), he should be reluctant to embrace any theory
entailing that whatever depends on the Prime Mover depends on something ultimately pointless.

2. The Commonly Held V iew .2 and Some of its Difficulties
Here are the main points of what seems to be the prevailing interpretation of the Prime Mover theory in
Lambda, (a) The Prime Mover causes eternal motion by being an object o f love or desire, or (in other words) by
being ’that for the sake o f which' (in the sense of 'end', not 'beneficiary'; 1072 a 26-b 3). (b) Although an object
o f love or desire might never exist (it might remain a forever unfulfilled ideal or objective), the Prime Mover, as the
text makes clear, is an actually existent active being, (c) The Prime Mover's activity is pure contemplation, (d)
Movement o f the first sphere arises because a soul or spiritual entity which is not the Prime Mover loves or desires
the Prime Mover or the latter's contemplative activity. (In such a case, the activity is hardly to be distinguished from
its subject.) This other spirit, as an expression o f love, gives rise to a physical image o f eternal contemplation ~
which physical image is the eternal movement o f the sphere. I shall sometimes refer to the second spirit as the soul
o f the first sphere, but however we label it, this spirit alone is efficient cause o f the motion. The Prime Mover,
though real, is not efficient, but is only (in some sense) the final cause o f motion.3
It is embarrassing for this interpretation that Lambda never mentions a spiritual agency that both moves the
sphere and is other than the Prime Mover. Equally embarrassing, too, that Aristotle begins by speaking o f the Prime
Mover as final cause, but soon presents it as also efficient.4 In general, nothing stands in the way o f applying the
notions efficient and final cause to what is in some sense the same entity, even in respect of the same movement or
change (cf. DA 415 b 9 ff.) But there is a problem in this case, since we are assuming (c): that the Prime Mover’s
activity is contemplative. How, in one and the same being, can contemplation give rise to motion as an efficient
cause? Should we then say that the Prime Mover has an efficient-causal activity that is other than contemplation?
. If so, how are two such different activities related in the one being?
In face of these conceptual difficulties one might think it prudent (textual evidence notwithstanding) to cling to
the idea of the Prime Mover as through and through contemplative, and as only a final cause of motion. The efficient
cause, then, is the distinct sphere-soul, which must now be understood as referred to in any passages dealing with the
efficien t-cau sin g o f the primary motion. The story is that the sphere-soul, from love, seeks to imitate the divine
contemplation, and eternal motion is the best it can do in this regard. But Aristotle says nothing about imitation here.
(Nor is this surprising, given that imitation implies distinct identities of imitator and imitated; for so far as his account
relates to the first sphere it does not mention a sphere-soul that is.other than the Prime Mover.) However, let us push
on and ask how the motion can be supposed to arise through imitation. Is the sphere-soul's love itself a kind of
contemplation o f the loved object? Yes, in a way, since this love does not produce or cause changes in its object.
Yet this love is held to give rise to motion. So the sphere-soul loves one thing and gives rise to something else. But
if giving rise to motion is itself a sort of noetic activity ,5 must we not say that the object o f this activity is loved — or
at least desired? In the present context Aristotle uses 'love' and 'desire' as virtual synonyms, so we can think o f the
sphere-soul as having love for motion in the sphere. Then that alone seems enough to explain the motion; so what
difference does it make for motion that the sphere-soul loves the divine contemplator? If none, then divine
contemplation falls out of the picture. It plays no part in the causation o f eternal motion, which is what this picture
is meant to explain.
All the same, let us continue with the assumption that according to Lambda the sphere-soul engages in a pair
of activities o f love or desire, one of which, love for the Prime Mover, somehow gives rise to the other, desire for
motion in the sphere. We note that Aristotle never says that more than one object is loved or desired in the production
of this motion. We should also register discomfort at having to attribute to the single sphere-soul these different noetic
activities, even if they are related It seemed to make sense to postulate a distinct sphere-soul in order to safeguard
the integrity o f the Prime Mover’s rôle in the theory, but now the safeguard itself turns out to be something of a hodge
podge. Let us, however, return to the point that the sphere-soul's love for the Prime Mover is a sort of contemplation
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o f its object. We might ask: if this soul can contemplate the Prime Mover, isn't that already the best form of
imitation? So why should it b¿ thought that the soul also desires to generate movement? It contemplates God, and
God, we are told, contemplates himself, so in one sense they do the same thing. Again, if the sphere-soul
contemplates and also, somehow as a result, desires to produce;an eternal movement as an image or symbol of
contemplation, then why not attribute these diverse activities to the Prime Mover itself? ~ in other words, why not
identify the Prime Mover with what I am calling the first sphere-soul?
But if the ultimate cause is simple and unitary as Aristotle says (1071 a 32), perhaps he ascribes to it just one
noetic activity. Assume this to be pure contemplation. And assume, too, that this contemplation is also a sort o f love.
Different theories are possible: he loves and contemplates himself, or die essences, or his own activity of
contemplation. And on some interpretations these are different descriptions of the same state o f affairs. At any rate,
what is loved must be wholly internal to the contemplation. Then what about motion? On this view, all we can say
is that motion occurs as a spin-off from pure contemplation. The motion is not desired by its so called agent, since
the latter's noetic activity is not geared to produce physical change. Then the motion simply happens — a cosmic
eternal accident. There is nothing outside the divine contemplator that could trip him into inadvertently causing
motion, nor any mechanism within him that could respond in that way to an external stimulus. For ex hvpothesi this
contemplator contains no mechanism for anything but contemplation.
So if the Prime Mover's single activity is contemplation, doing away with a distinct soul for the first sphere
leaves us without any basis for an intelligible account of eternal motion as somehow caused by the Prime Mover. This
is a point in favor o f the received interpretation, according to which a distinct sphere-soul gives rise to motion in the
first sphere by way of imitation of the divine contemplative activity. That, supposedly, is what Aristotle means when
he says that die Prime Mover moves as object of love or as that-for-the-sake-of-which in the sense o f 'end'. At 1072
b l-3 Aristotle pauses to distinguish two senses of 'that-for-the-sake-of-which', only one o f which he regards as
relevant here: die sense of objective or end of action as distinct from beneficiary o f action. He does not, however,
linger over possible ambiguities in the notion of 'objective'. Since he has just used this to disambiguate 'that-for-thesake-of-which', he presumably regards it as free from ambiguity itself (or from any that could affect the present
argument). But the imitation story does violence to our understanding o f 'objective'. An objective is realized or
approximately realized by the subject whose objective it is, and this being realized by the subject is a function o f the
objective's status as such. Now if the sphere-soul's love o f divine contemplation takes the form o f an impulse to
imitate it in a physical medium, then in relation to this imitative activity the divine contemplation is not an objective.
For the sphere-soul's activity o f producing motion cannot be said even approximately to enable the divine
contemplation to be. Rather, the end desired and brought about is a condition o f the sphere itself considered as a
living soul-governed being. This is the condition of its being like (more so than otherwise) the beloved object. We
have already noticed the awkwardness o f having to suppose that there are different objects o f love and desire, since
thé text mentions only one. Now we have to accept that when Aristotle says that the Prime Mover functions as thatfor-the-sake-of-which in the sense o f 'objective' or 'end', he is not speaking about an objective in the recognized
sense, even though this is a context where he consciously aims for precision - as well he might, given the obsçurity
of his topic. Divine contemplation, on the present account, is not the final cause o f motion strictly speaking, tíut its
exemplary cause.6 The final cause, as already observed, is the property (belonging to sphere-soul or sphere) of
actively being as similar as possible to a perfect contemplator.
I have just used the indefinite article to signal the fact, often remarked, that this explanation does not require
that the perfect contemplator should actually, as we would put it, exist. The sphere-soul's imitative activity cannot
bring such a God into existence, and such a God need not already exist for the soul to aspire to be godlike in its own
way. Aristotle should know better than to expose the divine Prime Mover to this objection, because in the
Metaphysics one of his reasons for complaining that Plato’s Forms (perfect exemplars) fail to account for change is
that they might as well not exist for all the difference they make (see e.g. 991 a 19-27; b 6-7; cf. 1071 a 20-22).7
This existential problem might be overcome if it were possible to argue that the sphere-soul, by engaging in
its kinetic activity, ensures the actual existence o f that which it is supposed thus to imitate. And such a move would
have the additional advantage of justifying Aristotle's choice of the notion 'objective' or 'end' to characterize the way
3
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in which the supreme being is cause o f motion. For the supreme being (or its active existence) could H5Í be thought
o f as the end o f that motion in the familiar, straightforward, sense o f 'end'. But this seems impossible if the being
in question is a pure contemplator, How could kinetic activity give rise to this, any more than this could give rise of
itself to motion?
If the Prime Mover is a pure contemplator, then whether or not Aristotle is entitled to hold that siich a Mover
must exist, it seems clear that in saying that the Mover is the 'end' o f motion Aristotle must mean, rather, that it is
the exemplary cause. Assuming for the moment that he does mean this, I now turn to a further difficulty which will
take a little time to develop. Let us ask whether divine contemplation, as well as being the 'end' (in that strained
sense) o f the first sphere’s kinetic activity, is also hi some sense an end in relation to the divine contemplator. From
the perspective o f Lambda, the answer should surely be Yes. One o f Lambda's central concerns is to show how the
universe depends on something supremely good. This means that it depends on that good qua good. Something good
may be an efficient cause o f X , but in that case iis causing X is not an immediate function of its goodness. As
efficient cause, it causes X because it has the power or will to do so, and only indirectly (if at all) because it, the
cause, is good. For example, it may be good because it has this will or power, in which case its goodness is
consequent on its efficient causal rôle. Or it may have the will or power because it is good, in which case its
goodness, again, is not as such die immediate cause of X. But that which is good makes a difference qua good only
through being acted towards as good, i.e. through being an end (cf. 988 b 8-16; 1091 b 16-20). (This is why in
Lambda Aristotle first emphasizes that the Prime Mover moves as an end, even though he then goes on to treat the
Prime Mover as also efficient cause o f the motion.) Our question now is whether the Mover's essential activity is
an end for the very being that engages in it. It must be, because otherwise however good the activity may be, it is
devoid o f purpose. It is engaged in, but not because it is good. Perhaps the being in question contemplates or does
whatever it does simply because it has an eternal tendency to do so, and there is nothing inside or outside to stop it.
Or, again, perhaps it does what it does by a sort of blind necessity - blind, that is, to value; for a being might know
what it is doing and even be voraciously keen on doing it, and yet lack all sense o f the value of what it is doing. And
yet its activity might still be splendid enough (by comparison with other things)8 to function as a model which the first
sphere-soul does its best to imitate by producing motion. In that case, although the motion o f that sphere, and
whatever else depends on it, does depend on the highest activity as final (in the odd sense o f 'exemplary') cause, it
seems also in a way a matter o f sheer brute fact that there exists a highest activity for the rest to depend on through
love and imitation. In other words: we have a cosmos alive forever with order and beauty, yet ultimately unfounded
on the good. But if this is credible, the Aristotelian philosopher should not be so sure that the processes within the
cosmos take place because they or their ends are fair and good -- if the goodness of the principle on which all else
depends is ultimately irrelevant to ils existence.
The proposition that the divine activity is, in the ordinary sense, an sud for the being engaged in it is required
by Aristotle's project in Lambda (as well as by his teleological approach to sublunary physics). And the proposition
would surely be accepted as part o f the Lambda theory by those who believe that Lambda’s God is lost in
contemplation andl'acts on" the universe only as exemplary cause. That the divine contemplation is an end for itself
is entirely in keeping with the general spirit of that picture. But if we fuss about details and insist on expecting from
Lambda a w ell made theory, we run up against this difficulty: if the theory represents the Prime Mover as
contemplative, there is no single sense o f 'end' in terms of which the key relations can all be expressed. For as well
as using the notion in the extraordinary sense of 'exemplary cause', Aristotle must use it in the same context in its
ordinary sense too. This is because o f the absurdity of supposing that God's activity takes place because God models
himself on an exemplar o f divine activity. It is like supposing that a Platonic Form is what it is because it imitates
or partakes o f itself. No one is more sensitive to this type of problem than Aristotle. Moreover, if something is
already sufficiently perfect to function as exemplar for other beings, then it has no need to imitate itself or anything
else in order to be as perfect as the theory of motion requires. So: for the exemplary being itself, its own activity,
o f whatever nature, must be an end in the ordinary sense: something that is enabled to be through being valued.
The difficulties which we have reviewed are remarkably similar. At every point of pressure one is forced to
countenance one or another multiplication o f entities unmentioned by the text. There had to be postulated a spheresoul (for the first sphere) distinct from the Prime Mover; and for that sphere-soul to do its job intelligibly, there had
4

to be assumed two different objects o f love or desire. Again, it was hard to make sense o f the sphere-soul's function
without ascribing to it two noetic activities different in kind. Finally, the account depends on multiplying senses of
’end’ not distinguished by Aristotle and using them together in the one theory. All this suggests some single central
error whose effects may be containable by one means or other, but always at the expense o f die text and o f theoretical
simplicity. The mistake, in my view, lies in supposing the Prime Mover's activity contemplative. If, on the contrary,
we suppose it essentially kinetic, we immediately cancel the need for a distinct efficient cause of motion. And without
that distinct efficient cause, there is nothing to which the Prime Mover must stand as exemplar; and nothing that
requires to be understood as active twice over in different ways and with different objects.

3. The Alternative Proposal, with Objections and Replies
Aristotle begins his explanation o f the primary motion by stating that its cause is a cause in the mode of final
causality: an object of love or desire. In other words, the eternal circular motion occurs in order that some objective
be realized. What objective? The natural answer is: the eternal motion itself, or something whose reality is
essentially bound up with this. Perhaps what is desired is more than the motion, but something which it would not
make sense to desire without desiring the motion. Such an answer is natural, because (I assume) to Aristotle nothing
is more intelligible than that what one desires one brings about, given the opportunity and if nothing stands in the way.
The point is not just that he would treat this as a necessary truth, but that he finds no metaphysical mystery in its being
true. The proposition that X is an end for an unhindered agent A says all that we need for understanding why A does
what is necessary for realizing X, and hence for understanding why X comes about.
So if the object o f love or desire is or includes the motion, that motion results is immediately intelligible;
whereas if what is loved is pure contemplation, the connection between love and motion is not only not selfexplanatory, but requires us to accept an unhappy proliferation o f entities. But what, more precisely, is the object
of love? It cannot be simply the motion, because in that case Aristotle would be saying that the Prime Mover is the
motion itself considered as end ofTmal cause. But in fact he says that the Prime Mover is noetically active, and
indeed is nothing but noetic activity. (And there is no reason to assume that when Aristotle says this he is not thinking
o f the Prime Mover as final cause but only in some other capacity.) Rotation, however, is a physical process, and
although it is an actuality of sorts, it is not a noetic activity, since if it were we ought to say that a top's spinning is
its thinking.
All the same, the rotation o f the first heaven is the visible aspect of its agent's noetic activity, since this (I shall
now assume) is an activity o f desiring that movement. For under the circumstances — metaphysically peculiar
circumstances — to desire the movement is already actually to generate it. So generating it is a noetic act, one surely
valued by the agent, if only because it is his and expresses him. Thus he values his own activity, not only its physical
effect. And since the generative activity and its effect are eternal, and each impossible without the other, one would
hardly know how to decide which, if either, is subordinate. Is the action of generating the movement engaged in so
that there be that movement, or is generating movement the principal end, the movement itself an essential
concomitant? What is more, since generating the motion is a noetic activity, the agent is immediately aware of it,
and, in the case we are considering, the awareness is pleasure (1072 b 17-24). Aristotle holds that pleasure enhances
the pleasurable activity not only in the sense of making it more worthwhile for the agent, but also by making him
better at it - more focussed and effective (EN 1075 a 30-36). One way o f understanding this is to think o f enjoying
an activity as a way of spontaneously valuing it, and to see this valuing as immediately expressed in intense and
controlled application to what one is doing.
The case we are considering lies at the conceptual limit where there is no disengaging the eternal motion from
the noetic act of generating it, nor the act of generating from the pleasurable awareness o f itself. So as well as being
able to see why the motion occurs (because it is a valued end), perhaps we can see why it is also right to say, too, that
the end (the Prime Mover as final cause) is a noetic activity. This analysis also explains how Aristotle can easily shift
between speaking o f the Mover as final and as efficient cause. What is valued here is an activity that must be
described in the same terms as the activity which values it and thereby efficiently secures its existence. And finally
5

the analysis gives two pointers (which I shall not follow much further in this paper) towards making sense of
Aristotle’s statement that the Prime Mover's thinking is a thinking of thinking (1074 b 33-35).9 It is a^noeticactivity"
which (i) carries awareness o f itself, and (ii) noetically aims at activity such as itself.
The salient feature of this interpretation is that, according to it, the activity o f pure contemplation plays no part
in Lambda's explanation o f eternal motion. I now pass on to consider objections, but not without noting that it does
not follow from the present account that Aristotle cannot consistently hold that God contemplates. My contention is
not that Aristotle never recognizes a contemplative divinity, but that contemplation is not what constitutes God Prime
Mover according to the Lambda account. Since, however. Lambda is primarily concerned with the eternal motion
and its ultimate cause, rather than with the topic of divinity as such,10 the claim just made amounts to the claim (for
which I shall continue to argüe) that Lambda has no place for a purely contemplative God.
I now discuss four objections (or sets o f objections) in turn.

Objection,A
Aristotle insists that the Prime Mover is absolutely changeless (e.g., 1073 a 22-25). But how can a changeless
being be, by its desiring, kinetically active and an efficient cause? That these functions exclude changelessness seems
clear from 1072 a 30, where the intellect is said to be moved by its object (to noëton). The context (1072 a 26-29)
shows that the object o f intellect is also the object o f desire. Presumably desiring counts as a kind o f being moved
(cf. DA 433 b 10-16; M A 700 b 24 - 701 a 1). But in that case, the being which desires is not the unmoved Prime
Mover. And if we assume that the being which desires is the efficient cause of movement, then the Prime Mover can
at most be the final cause (in some sense) . But if the Mover is not an efficient cause o f motion, its characteristic
activity cannot be kinetic; hence it must be contemplative, since these are the only options under consideration.11
In reply: It is necessary, perhaps, to emphasize that the Prime Mover's changelessness does not entail that the
Mover is not kinetically active; nor that the Mover is not an efficient cause. According to Aristotle’s conceptions,
being an agent o f physical change is not itself a change undergone by the agent. Nor is an agent as such the subject
o f the change which it brings about. Nor is an agent necessarily liable to suffer change in consequence of bringing
about a change in something else (e.g., a rebound effect). This applies only to corporeal agents which act through
physical contact with their patients. Again, living corporeal agents like ourselves cannot produce change in external
objects except by means o f changes in their own bodies; hence in causing change we also undergo change. But if,
for example, the external change is willed by the living agent, then the ultimate source o f this change is the soul,
which acts by giving rise to intermediate changes in the agent's body. And although the psycho-physical compound
cannot produce external changes without itself undergoing change, this is no ground for thinking that the soul itself,
considered in abstraction, must undergo change in order to give rise to the bodily change. And in fact Aristotle holds
that in animals the soul as such is unchanging insofar as it is the efficient cause of animal locomotion. (For these
doctrines, see Phvs. III. 3; DA 417 b 8-9; QQ 1.6; DA 1.3.) Again, in our own case the desires from which we act
often come to us with a flurry o f emotion (pathos). But the flurry itself is not what directs and controls the desired
change. Direction and control are due to practical intelligence, and a flurry can even diminish our effectiveness. Now
the Prime Mover, on the view which I am advocating, is related to the sphere which it immediately moves in
something like the way in which soul is related to body in an organism (on this, see under Objection B). The Prime
Mover is not a corporeal thing; its causal activity is eternal; and the intensity of its eternal interest never fluctuates.
Hence this Mover is in an absolutely steady state of activity (though Aristotle would not call it a 'state'). And
although (on this account) the Prime Mover is said to 'love' (erän) its own activity, it is absurd (and certainly
unnecessary) to equate this love with a disturbing fit of feeling.
However, all this does not alter the fact that at 1072 a 30 Aristotle says that intellect is moved by its object,
which is also the object of love and desire. So intellect qua efficient cause is here said to be in movement itself - in
psychic movement. How, then, can the absolutely changeless Mover operate as an intellectual efficient cause?
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In reply: The statement occurs at the beginning of Aristotle's discussion of the Prime Mover, and he begins
in this way because (as it seems to me) he wants to emphasize the Prime Mover's rôle as final cause. (This, we have
seen, is due to his concern to show how the good qua good is the ultimate principle o f the universe.) When we think
of the desired end as cause, the desire for that end figures as an intermediate link in the causal chain. In this passage
(as elsewhere; cf. Phvs. VIII. 5, DA 433 b 13 ff.) Aristotle applies an abstract schema o f causal series. In the
schema, the series originates from a first, and unmoved, mover, while the subsequent members (up to the last) have
the distinct rôle of moved movers (i.e. movers which cause motion through being moved). In the schema, in short,
being moved is virtually synonymous with not being first. Hence desire (or the faculty of desire), being intermediate,
is a movement (or subject o f movement). However, we can also think of the desire (the efficient cause) as having
co-primacy with the final cause, since the desired end would not be a cause were it not for the desire which brings
it about. That is: without the desire, no end would be aimed at, nor would there be any outcome requiring to be
explained in terms o f the end. From this point of view the first cause includes desire. It is not just the end, but
desire-for-the-end (or, alternatively, the end-as-desired). So desire is not now intermediate, and need not be viewed
as a movement. In sum: the fact that desire can figure as a change is not an independent ground for denying it the
status of first (hence changeless) mover, because in Aristotle's schema we see it as a change just when, and because,
we adopt a perspective from which it appears as a causal intermediary.12
One must also bear in mind that when Aristotle initiates his account o f the Prime Mover, 1072 a 24 ff., he
draws on what is familiar to us; how else could he hope to render the Prime Mover intelligible? In saying that the
object of desire moves the intellect, he makes a general point, and one that we can grasp straightaway, since we all
know what it is to desire something and thereby be set in motion to bring it about. In our case, occurrent (as distinct
from dispositional) desire is of course episodic, because we are moved by different desires in different situations, and
sometimes we are not moved by desire at all. Perhaps the language o f 1072 a 30 reflects this feature o f the familiar
case, but we need not assume that Aristotle means to transfer it to the extraordinary case which he is trying to
expound.
But it is still true that a desire is for something of a different nature from itself, and in this respect is like a
kinesis that tends to some state in which it naturally terminates. Such intrinsically term-directed processes are classed
as incomplete (or unfulfilled) actualities (Phvs. 201 b 31-32; Meta. 1048 b 18 ff.), and it seems that desire has
essentially the same structure. How can incomplete actuality be found in the perfectly actual Prime Mover?
In reply: We must distinguish logical incompleteness from incompleteness in a more substantial sense. An
ordinary desire counts as an 'incomplete actuality', because it "asks for" fulfillment before being fulfilled (and it may
be frustrated). The Prime Mover cannot be subject to such a desire, any more than the eternally moving heaven is
subject to the parallel type of kinesis, i.e. the self-terminating type. When dealing with sublunary processes, Aristotle
tends to treat self-terminating kinesis as the paradigm of change and motion; but he is nonetheless willing to apply
'kinesis*to the endless rotation of the heavens. Why should he not also be willing to ascribe to the Prime Mover a kind
of desire that admittedly fails to count as 'desire' if we take sublunary cases as paradigms ~ a desire which is never
(in the substantial sense) incomplete because it is never not fulfilled, and which is all the same endless because its
object is endless too? However, in the logical sense a desire on the part of the Prime Mover is as incomplete as the
humblest desire. That is to say: desire is necessarily for something else, because 'He desires' is a logically
incomplete expression. A desire that is incomplete in this sense is not an incomplete actuality, since it is not a possible
actuality at all. If on this ground we refuse to ascribe desire for X (whatever the X) to the Prime Mover (our reason
being that this Mover must not be associated with a state in itself so radically incomplete that it cannot be real at all
unless logically completed by an object), we can be dealt a quick and compelling answer: by the same token, no sort
o f noetic activity, not even contemplation, is ascribable to the perfect being, since any noetic activity must have an
object.
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Objection B
On the account which I am proposing, the Prime Mover is identical with what I have so far referred to as the
soul of the first sphere. If this is Aristotle's meaning in Lambda, why does he omit to say that the Primé Mover is
the soul o f the heaven or indeed a soul at all?
In reply: It is not surprising that he does not state that the Prime Mover is the soul (psuchë) of the sphere,
because in De Anima he defines soul as the first actuality of a natural organic body (412 a 27-28). By contrast, the
primary sphere is not an organic body,13 and the Prime Mover is nothing but second (complete, fully functioning)
actuality — in all but name, since there is nothing in the Mover in relation to which it is second. Thus the term
'psuchë' is reserved for that level of life that preserves the organism's fitness for active functioning, but which cannot
be aroused into active functioning except by external stimuli (cf. Phys. 253 a 11-20). It is the modem approach to
discuss soul in terms of certain relations to body: for us, the burning question is whether we should think of a soul
as essentially, perhaps categorially, different from any corporeal object, even if specially connected with one corporeal
object in particular. From the point of view of this debate, the Mover of the first sphere and the soul of an animal
may seem to have more in common metaphysically than either would have with a supposedly transcendent spirit that
engages in no corporeal activity. But for Aristotle, I think, the more important distinction would be between the life
of a being that is intermittently active in relation to environmental stimuli, and an absolutely independent continuously
active life. From this point of view there is more in common between the Mover of the first sphere (the only
unenvironed physical object) and the supposed transcendent spirit, than between the Prime Mover and any animal soul.
For Aristotle and those around him, there would be a natural conceptual boundary between the animal soul and the
other two cases. Thus it would be natural for them to restrict the term 'psuchë' to its usual biological context.

Objection C
If the Prime Mover's activity is kinetic, why is it necessary to suppose the Mover a noetic being at all?
Aristotle explains many cases of motion without tracing it back to mind or soul, as when he treats the falling of earth
as the expression o f a simple corporeal nature. Again, ends can function as final causes without being desired or
grasped in thought; the living world is full of examples. It would seem that if Aristotle conceives o f the primary
source o f motion as an essentially kinetic agent, he could have grounded the movement in the sphere itself, that solid
corporeal substance, saying (as he does in D £ 1.2) that it is simply the nature of this body to rotate. The
appropriateness o f rotation for a body like this would then be cited as the end that explains the motion - not a
transcendent end, to be sure, but one which a scientist like Aristotle could readily make sense of, since it has nothing
in it of the supernatural. In effect, then, the rotation, or else the rotating sphere itself - that physical object - would
be the Prime Mover. Or if this seems too bleak, then perhaps Aristotle could have grounded its motion in something
like a soul (even if he would not have called it 'soul' for the reason, discussed under Objection B): say, a principle
o f desire and pleasurable awareness, but not an intellectual principle. The Prime Mover must of course be perfectly
active, but why should the life o f perfect activity be a life of intellect?14 These concepts do not seem to be
immediately connected, and the experience and ordinary opinions of Aristotle's audience even suggest· that they may
not be necessarily connected at all. For on thé one hand it is much more obvious to those whom he addresses that
the heaven is perpetually active than that it is powered by intellect; and on the other hand our own intellectual activity
is intermittent by any ordinary standard of judgment. And even if Aristotle has reason to think that the intellect simply
is its activity, having nothing o f itself left over, so to speak, to be the separately identifiable potential for that activity,
he would not be entitled from that to conclude that this all-or-nothing character belongs uniquely to intellect. Perhaps
there is another such potential-free kind of activity that would explain why the containing sphere of the universe could
not be in motion at all were it not in motion with perfect continuity for always.
Does Aristotle make his Prime Mover noetic simply because he wants to elevate intellect in his scheme? That
may be why, but then this deification of intellect is nothing but an act of intellect-worship; it is not motivated by the
demands of a theory explaining the primary motion. It is better to say (and this is the objection) that Aristotle makes
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the Prime Mover noetic precisely because he attributes to the Mover an activity whose place in the theory could not
be taken by some non-intellectual process in the way in which the alleged kinetic noetic activity could be mimicked
or reproduced by one that involves no intellect and perhaps not even sold. But that must be because he takes the Prime
Mover's activity to be essentially contemplative, since only contemplation has no effects that could conceivably be
produced by something other than an intellect.
It is worth noting, before we go to the reply, that the way in which this objection has been developed makes
it harder than ever to understand how Aristotle, if he really wanted to explain the motion o f the sphere, could resort
to the concept o f the contemplating Prime Mover. For we have just been looking at two possible accounts o f the
motion which are both well within Aristotle's grasp and which make the contemplative Mover redundant. It is also
worth noting that the problem o f explaining why the Prime Cause in Lambda is an intellect is peculiarly baffling in
view of the fact that this Cause only gives rise (somehow) to a simple motion. Hardly anything in Lambda suggests
that the divine mind also determines the intricate sublunary forms that work on the whole so well to all eternity.
These are the forms which, as often as not, have compelled the belief that 'there is a Mind behind it all’, whether this
is held as an article of faith or as the most rational hypothesis. By contrast, the divine intellect o f Lambda is in charge
of an effect so monolithic that it hardly needs mind to explain it, and might even seem not to require explanation at
all.
In reply: The Prime Mover is the source of an eternal (a'idios) movement, which means, I think, not that the
Mover eternally produces movement, but that what the Mover produces is a movement essentially eternal and allcontaining in time and space. This (or producing this) is the Prime Mover's end, comprehensive and indivisible. But
something like this could hardly be an end at all unless it were an end for an intellect; to be brought into being, it has
to be understood. And now we can see that the sheer rotation itself, so easy to describe in physical terms, is not what
is centrally aimed for; instead (as Aristotle argues in detail in Physics VIII) the rotation is simply what the intellect
knows must take place if there is to be an eternal world-making movement — the Prime Mover's true objective.
Add to this that it cannot be by accident that the effect of the primary rotation pervades the entire universe, not
only contributing to the motions of the inner spheres, but thereby eventually providing the ongoing conditions (though
not the particular structures and forms) of all that takes place in the sublunar domain. The Prime Mover is not the
soul of the world, if by this we mean a single principle that steers all things so that the life o f all things is its one life.
Rather, it is a spirit that acts to make possible the generations o f many independently natured substances through
infinite time. But such a general end could not be an end except to one capable o f grasping it intellectually. The
analogy of the military commander in Lambda 10 (1075 a l l ff.) makes the point. A commander sets the framework
for operations; he does not expressly dictate the detail that unfolds within the field secured by his influence. The
Prime Mover of Lambda need not and probably cannot be omniscient. But it does not follow that the cosmos is
something not meant by the Mover - whether because he is lost in pure contemplation or because he is only a
rudimentary impulse, corporeal or psychic, that issues in circular motion.

Objection D
In making the Prime Mover an essentially kinetic agent, am I not bringing it down too low? This is not just
a question of dignity, but of explanatory power. If the Mover is as closely related to the first sphere and its motion
as I am suggesting, then it verges on sharing the physical nature of what it is supposed to explain. Yet Aristotle
plainly denies this when, for example, he says at 1073 a 4-5 that the Prime Mover is a substance 'separated from
sensible things' (kechôrismenë tön aisthëtônL Can we take this statement seriously without being led back to the
contemplation story?
The statement is usually understood to mean that the Prime Mover is remote from sensible things in a way in
which a soul is not remote from its body. Yet on the account here proposed, the relation of the Mover to the first
sphere is obviously similar to that of soul to body, despite the difference discussed above between the Mover and what
Aristotle would be happy to term a 'soul'. Now an ordinary body-soul composite (an organism) is as a metaphysical
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whole (not merely qua body) a natural substance, part of the natural world. How, thenjam I not implying that the
complex consisting of Prime Mover and first sphere stands on the same metaphysical level (despite its extraordinary
physical position) as a humble organism? But in that case the spirit which moves the sphere is no more and no less
'separated from sensible things' than the soul of any animal.
In reply: In the case o f an animal or a plant, the soul is soul-of-a-body because the psychic activities
characteristic o f the organism are also corporeal, involving a body. The reason, we could say, why the soul is ß f a
body is that it is the sort o f life-principle to be expressed by such functions or activities. It is not as if the psycho
somatic activities result because the soul, independently characterized, is somehow connected with a body. Rather,
the soul relates to the body so that there should occur just such activities. In other words the soul's nature is to be
the source o f these kinds o f activities, and that is why it is related to a body: because only so are the activities
possible.
Accepting the parallel with the Prime Mover and the sphere, let us apply this point to their case. We get the
result that die Mover is to be thought of not as primarily connected with the sphere and consequently giving rise to
eternal movement; but as first of a nature to give rise to this movement, and hence connected with a suitable mobile:
the sphere. The sphere, of,course, is perceptible (or so Aristotle assumes), but not so the movement. I return to the
point that the nature (eternal) o f such a movement can be grasped only be intellect. But now what is relevant is not
the Prime Mover's grasp o f this end, but ours. We cannot form the idea of such a movement from sense experience
along with memory and sensory imagination. And our knowledge that it occurs cannot be got by observations, but
only through intellectual reflection. Observation can confirm that the motion is circular, but not that it is eternal.
Thus what the Prime Mover does cannot be grasped through perception. (We can perceive arbitrarily selected finite
portions o f eternal rotation, but none o f these is what per se the Mover gives rise to .15)
If, then, we characterize the Prime Mover in terms of what it does, we do arrive at a sense in which the Mover,
so considered, is beyond anything perceptible: à sense that does not apply to an ordinary soul because an ordinary
soul's activities are spelt out in effects which can be observed from beginning to end. It is interesting that this
distinction can be sustained even if we suppose that the Prime Mover is as intimately related to the sphere as any
organic soul to its body. However, I shall now argue that in the case of the Prime Mover, the relation is more
intimate still.
Let me begin by noting that, notwithstanding the previous argument, it is hard to shake off the impression that
when Aristotle says that the Prime Mover is separated from sensible things, he means that the Mover is somehow
infinitely remote from anything physical. How does this impression arise? Because, I suggest, we tend to think of
Prime Mover as introducing motion into the first sphere. Of course there was never a temporal beginning of the
motion, so it is as if the Mover has never not been inducing it. Even so, we picture the source o f motion as
metaphysically external to the sphere. Naturally one regards this as a symmetric relation, so the sphere is external
to the Mover. This can be stated by saying that if we suppose per impossibile that there had been no motion (and no
activity on the part of the Mover), it does not follow that there would not have been the sphere. The sphere receives
the motion and has always been receiving it, but we can imagine the sphere existing independently o f its motion even
though the hypothesis of independence could never be tested since the test would require an impossible situation. But
now there is a problem. If the sphere exists whether or not it is in motion, then it exists whether or not the Mover
exists. (For we know nothing of what we are calling 'the Mover' except that it moves the sphere. For all we know,
without that kinetic activity it would simply not be.) But this independently existing sphere must have some sort of
locomotory nature. Is it its nature to rotate, as Aristotle suggests at D £ 1.2? If so, then if there were after all a
distinct Mover, there would be nothing for the Mover to do. On the other hand, it is inconceivable to Aristotle that
the sphere should be o f a nature to remain at rest or to move in a straight line, since then the Mover would be stuck
with the Sisyphean task o f forcing it to move against nature for all eternity (cf. D £ 284 a 14 - b 1).
Our assumption is that the sphere would exist even if (per impossibile) it were not in motion. Let us now ask:
if (per impossibile) the sphere did not even exist, would its Mover exist? Certainly not as an actual or potential
Mover, so not at all if the. Mover is only or essentially that. Thus as soon as we hypothesize the non-existence of the
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sphere, a perceptible entity, we risk plunging the Prime Mover into hypothetical non-existence. This is hardly being
’separated from sensible things'. Or rather: the Prime Mover can be salvaged, but only if we suppose that whatever
it is that moves the sphere is also and primarily something else whose activity does not depend on the availability o f
the sphere. This something else is o f course the contemplator, who as such is able to be separate from sensible things,
including the sphere.
Let us bring this into relation with the previous problem, that o f the nature o f the independent sphère.
Apparently we must say that the sphere, a physical object, has in itself no nature for movement or rest in any way
rather than another.16 By itself one might be prepared to accept this Aristotelian anomaly; after all, the primary sphere
is an unusual entity in other ways too. But now look where we have landed. Not only are we compelled to postulate
a Prime Mover whose essential activity is in no way kinetic, but the same path has led to a corresponding mobile
devoid o f any nature for motion or rest. And these are supposed to explain the motion o f the universe! One might
as well explain it as the result o f a transaction between a number from pure arithmetic and a figure o f pure geometry.

Both sides o f this conundrum arise from the same assumption: that the mover imparts motion to the sphere as
an independently existing subject. But this assumption does not appear in Lambda. At 1069 b 24-26 Aristotle says
that eternal moving things (the spheres) have matter for being in one place or another (sc. with respect to their parts),
though not matter for generation and destruction. But this does not at all imply that they have matter for being or not
being in motion. Rest is impossible for the first heaven: not merely physically impossible but metaphysically so.
There is no rest without time, and no time independently of the motion o f the first sphere (Thvs. 223 b 12 ff.; cf. 1071
b 9-10). A sphere neither at rest nor in motion is not any sort o f physical thing but a geometrical abstraction, which
is why the first sphere, considered apart from its Mover, turned out to lack locomotory nature. Its motion is what
gives physical being to the sphere, and thereby creates the conditions o f spatio-temporality for Ml other objects.
Motion is no more an attribute o f the sphere than life or existence is an attribute.17 It may even be too weak to say
that the sphere is essentially in motion, because in general if something essentially F ceases to be F, then although
that substance has ceased to be, there is something of it left over, remnants or rudiments for something else. But if
the sphere were not in motion there would be nothing at all. It is as if the motion is not only the essence o f the sphere,
but its matter. Indeed, it has no matter (except for "local" matter) if matter is distinct from essence. This raises the
interesting possibility that when Aristotle speaks of essences without matter, what he has in mind need not be
incorporeal.
The present account can do justice to Aristotle's statement that the Prime Mover is 'separated from sensible
things'. The Prime Mover is indeed less remote from the sphere than an organic soul from its body, for the
organism's body cannot be entirely within reach of its soul in the way in which the sphere is held in being by the
Prime Mover. The organic body has material components which are independent o f the organism since they remain
after death. But the sphere's existence is through and through the effect of the Mover-intellect.18 We perceive this
effect — the sphere in motion -- when we perceive the stars carried round on it. And we are then perceiving the
condition o f all other physical processes including those necessary for sense perception itself. In short, the intellect
that moves the sphere is bevond all sensible things because on such a principle depends the entire system o f sensibles,
or, as Aristotle says,'th e heavens and the world of nature'(1072 b 13-14).

4. Theoria in Lambda and in Nicomachean Ethics X
I have argued: (i) that if Lambda equates the Prime Mover's activity with contemplation (understood according
to the distinction in Section 1), then Lambda fails as a theory of the motion which the Prime Mover is introduced to
explain; (ii) that a reasonable theory emerges if we suppose the activity straightforwardly kinetic; and (iii) that this
interpretation can accommodate such crucial positions as that the Prime Mover is a thinking of thinking, that it
functions as a final cause, that it is separated from sensible things, and that it is not in any ordinary sense a soul. But
these arguments against the traditional view are worthless if Aristotle's text decisively favors a contemplative Prime
Mover. The passage to which I now turn is star witness for that view.

11

On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world o f nature. And its life (diagöge) is such as
the best which we enjoy, and enjoy but for a short time. For it is ever in this state (which we cannot be),
since its actuality is also pleasure. (And therefore waking, perception and thinking are most pleasant,
and hopes and memories are so because o f their reference to these.) And thought in itself thé noësis hë
kath'hauten) deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thought in the fullest sense with that
which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks itself because it shares the nature o f the object o f
thought; for it becomes an object o f thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, so that
thought and the object o f thought are the same. For that which is capable o f receiving die object o f
thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the latter
[sc. possession] rather than the former [sc. receptivity] is the divine element which thought seems to
contain, and thesria is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which
we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more.... (1072 b 13-26,
Revised Oxford Translation).
There has never been the slightest doubt, so far as I know, that 'the best which we enjoy' alludes to the ethical
doctrine that perfect human happiness is contemplation. So we must view this passage in the light of the argument
o f EN X 6-8, where the doctrine is most fully expounded. And we are bound to give special attention to the
subsidiary argument at EM 1178 b 7-22 proving that the gods do nothing but contemplate.19 Our question, then, is
whether Metaphysics 1072 b 13-26 tells us that the divine activity is contemplation.
Let me begin with the occurrence o f 'thesria' at line 24. I have not translated, since to do so would settle the
issue in advance. The word is usually correctly rendered by 'contemplation' or a synonym. But if this is its meaning
here, what leads up to the proposition that contemplation is 'most pleasant and best'? The immediately preceding lines
22-23 are beside the point, since they say that noetic activity is more divine than capacity, whereas what we need is
a reason why one special kind o f noetic activity is best, namely contemplation. Lines 19-21 may provide a reason.
They speak o f thought as in some way the same as its object. However, this fails to connect with the point that
contemplation is best unless we assume (A l) that the identity o f thought with its object applies exclusively to
contemplation. But that assumption is not mandatory, if, as I argued in Section 3, divine kinetic activity can be
understood as an intellectual desire for what is not other than itself (and see further below).
So let us go back to lines 14-15 where Aristotle compares God's activity with the best that human beings can
engage in. This can be read as paving the way to a statement about contemplation provided we assume (A2) that
Aristotle not only has it in mind here that contemplation is the best human activity, but also means the comparison
in respect o f contemplation. This assumption is not mandatory either, as I shall argue presently. Yet in the absence
o f both A l and A2, the passage as a whole contains nothing to motivate the statement at 24 that thesria is best, if what
this means is: 'Contemplation is best'. But it need not mean this. In Peripatetic circles, 'theorem' had taken on the
sense o f intelligent activity in general as contrasted with a corresponding capacity or disposition. (No doubt this was
because the standard illustrations make the point in terms of theoretical knowledge, its exercise and its possession;
cf. D A 417 a 31-32; D A 735 a 10-12; Plato, Theaetetus. 197 b -1 9 9 b.) If we take 24 as saying that noetic activity
(o f whatever kind) is best by comparison with the various grades o f potentiality that apply in the human case, then
the statement is well connected with what precedes.20
I shall come to A l at the end o f this paper. For the moment let us consider A2. It might conceivably be argued
that when Aristotle compares the divine actiyity to the best that human beings enjoy, he is not referring to human
contemplation in particular. He might merely be saying: 'Whatever activity of ours we reasonably hold most precious
can afford us a glimpse o f what it is like to be God'. But several themes in the context (as well as some o f the
language) are so reminiscent o f doctrines in EN X that it would be unrealistic not to accept that he has human
contemplation expressly in mind. Even so, we must note that what he stresses at 1072 b 14 ff. are certain general
characteristics (such as continuity and pleasure) of divine activity which correspond to criteria used in the Ethics (cf.
1177 a 21-27) for deciding which human activity is perfect human happiness. There is nothing about the way in which
these characteristics are presented in Lambda that compels the inference that the supreme human activity resembles
the divine in anything more specific than iust those general respects. Hence even if Aristotle is specifically referring
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to contemplation when he speaks of the best human activity, he need not be implying that the divine activity is
contemplative. On the other hand, it is difficult to resist the inference that he does imply this, in view of the argument
at JEN 1178 b 7 ff. that contemplation is the only activity that it makes sense to ascribe to the gods. That gives the
ethical philosopher an additional reason for identifying the supreme human good with contemplation; 'we should strive
to live like the immortals as far as possible' (1177 b 31-34).
But let us be clear that there is only one statement in Lambda itself that justifies transferring to the Prime Mover
o f Lambda the contemplative notion o f divinity which appears in EN X. This is the remark that the Mover's life is
like human activity at its best. And the evidential value of this not only depends on the plausibility o f assumption A2
(which I continue to discuss), but is not increased by the presence of the word 'theöria' at 1072 b 24, since there is
no independent ground for interpreting this as 'contemplation'. But it may all the same seem obvious that since (a)
(as I admit) Aristotle has human contemplation in mind at 1072 b 14-15, and (b) one of his reasons in EN X for
equating contemplation with the human summum bonum is that the gods do nothing but contemplate, he must, in
Lambda, be endorsing exactly that picture of God when he illustrates divine beatitude by a comparison with human
happiness. However, the principle o f charity should make us cautious about embracing this interpretation, although
o f course charity is only one consideration amongst others. For if the interpretation is correct, Aristotle has made
a dubious move, it is one thing to allude to an ethical doctrine about the place of contemplation in human life in order
to illustrate the quality of the divine existence; another to press the grounds of the ethical doctrine into service as part
o f a metaphysical theory of the Prime Mover’s nature. Aristotle's abstract propositions about the Prime Mover in
Lambda do not depend on the reference to human contemplation, since this is only illustrative; hence they do not
depend on a reason given elsewhere, in an ethical treatise, why contemplation should be what we refer to when we
refer to the finest human activity. For even if that reason is weak (in fact, even if no reason at all had been given),
the illustration would still make its purely illustrative point in the metaphysical context. In other words, merely by
using the illustration, the metaphysician does not make himself responsible for considerations that were used in the
Ethics to justify treating contemplation as the supreme end of human life. But the metaphysician would be making
himself responsible for those considerations if he means to import them (not merely their illustrative conclusion) into
his metaphysical theory. So if Aristotle does intend this in Lambda, one is entitled to expect him to do here what he
does not: to present and defend afresh the thesis that God is solely contemplative, and to present it in a form that fits
it for the metaphysical context.
This objection is not as tenuous as it may at first seem. What has escaped notice so far (in this and many other
attempts to interpret this portion o f Lambda) is that the point about divine contemplation in the Ethics is logically as
well as methodologically unsuitable for direct transference into the doctrine o f Lambda. This is because Lambda is
primarily not about God, but about the Prime Mover. If Aristotle wants to assimilate the Prime Mover to the gods
o f EN X, he needs to do more in Lambda than simply remind us (by means o f a reference to human happiness) of
the EN picture of the gods. For nothing in that picture suggests that divine contemplation is a final cause o f any sort
o f cause o f physical motion in anything. To secure this position in Lambda, Aristotle would still have io add that
divine contemplation is somehow the cause of motion.21 And (so I have argued) there is nothing in Lambda
independently considered, any more than there is in the Ethics, to suggest that he means that addition or expects us
to take it for granted.
On the contrary, insofar as Lambda is intended to show that the Prime Mover should be equated with God (on
the grounds that the Mover enjoys perfect life, goodness and pleasure), Aristotle would do well to have us forget the
ethical view of the gods as sheerly contemplative. The purpose of that argument in the Ethics is to recommend
contemplation as the crowning activity of human existence. To make this case, he must undermine tire pretensions
of excellent practical and political activity, which many in his audience would regard as the most honorable human
occupation, especially when conducted on a grand scale and successfully. The need to correct this misconception
would be all the greater if, as is often supposed, the Nicomachean Ethics is addressed to youths being groomed for
statesmanship. (Aristotle must know that they are in for a surprise in the last lap of his lectures; after all, he has said
at the memorable beginning:
Even if [human happiness] is the same [sc. in definition] for an individual and a city, it is better and more
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perfect to secure it and preserve it for the city. For while one should be glad o f it even in the case o f
a single individual alone, it is more noble and more divine when achieved for a nation and for cities
(1094 b 7 1 0 . Revised Oxford Translation).
And has he not, at a later stage, lectured on the virtue of magnificence?) To refute the rival claim of political activity
(the only serious contender), Aristotle argues, inter alia, that the life o f the noblest beings o f all allows no scope for
human-style practical excellence, since this is exercised always in response to challenges arising from the social and
physical environment. For the gods, then, contemplation is the only activity left over out o f the various activities
considered worthwhile in the Ethics. The Ethics, however, is of course concerned only with activities open to man.
In short, one kind of worthwhile activity that inevitably gets no mention in the Ethics is that o f causing the world
making motion o f the universe!
So even if in the Ethics Aristotle has it in mind that, were he doing metaphysics he would be arguing that God
is mover o f the first heaven, it would be absurdly pedantic to introduce this thought when what concerns him is not
to give a complete theory o f the divine life, but to attend to just that aspect that can be identified with a value
practicable bv hurpan beings. I do not mean to deny that he sincerely holds in the Ethics (and possibly elsewhere) that
God contemplates; but I am suggesting that it would be naive to take EN X as evidence that Aristotle makes it a point
o f theology that God does nothing but contemplate. There are reasons why EN X should ignore any divine kinetic
activity. Not only is contemplation the one godlike activity that can inspire a practicable human ideal, but to mention
God's kinetic agency would even be counterproductive in this context. It would tend to reinforce the commonsense
view that splendid political activity is the acme of human life. Thus when Aristotle moralizes in EN X that we can
engage in fine and noble actions without being rulers over earth and sea (1179 a 4-5), it will not help his case if at
this moment his audience remembers that the gods, the aristocracy o f the universe, are usually imagined as lords of
nature, and that cosmologists as different as Aristotle and Anaxagoras have raised this into a truth o f metaphysics.
And, in reverse, it is equally clear that when Aristotle is engaged on the argument o f Lambda, it is better for him to
ignore than to highlight what he says about God in the context of ethics, since there the salient feature o f divinity is
its total disconnection from physical change.22
The remark at 1072 b 14-15 that the Prime Mover's activity is like the best that we enjoy has been treated by
commentators as a funnel through which to inject into Lambda the contemplative God of the Ethics. How would the
course o f interpretation have run if Aristotle had not said just that? This is a pertinent question, because, as I argued,
any implied allusion to human contemplation is illustrative rather than logically necessary for the theory o f the Prime
Mover. Had he said only what was strictly necessary, and if at 1072 b 24 he had used the word 'energeia' instead
o f 'theöria' (its synonym in this context),23 then the contemplating gods of the Ethics would have made no impact on
the interpretation of Lambda, and the doctrine of Lambda would probably have been seen as a refined version of that
of the Physics, according to which the Prime Mover is efficient cause and kinetic agent. The refinements consist in
the introduction o f the idea that the Mover is also a final cause, and in the explicit claim that it is noetic.
But whatever the fate of Lambda-exegesis in the counterfactual absence of the "funnel” statement, the statement
cannot ensure a happy passage between the protreptic of EN X 6-8 and the metaphysics o f the Prime Mover. The
ethical concern calls for a God that makes no physical difference (not one that makes a difference but only as a final
cause), whereas the metaphysical explanation needs a deity that can be intelligibly related to motion. The internal
requirements o f both contexts are best served by mutual insulation. If, as I imagine, Aristotle could sense this as
clearly as I believe we can work it out, then we cannot suppose that at 1072 b 14-15 he intended to equate the divine
activity with contemplation. Hence we must take the statement as (no doubt) consciously referring to human
contemplation, but not as assimilating God's happiness to ours in this specific respect. Instead, the comparison is in
respect o f these characteristics o f human contemplation that make it (as compared with other human activities)
uniquely godlike, i.e. uniquely similar to God's intellectual projection o f the eternal motion. Some o f these
characteristics are discussed in ΕΝ Χ·7; thus, for instance, contemplation is the work o f what is sovereign in us (i.e.
intellect); it is in the highest degree continuous (i.e. contains no internal causes or reasons for ceasing); it is in the
highest degree pleasant, self-sufficient and leisurely (i.e. not shaped in response to external demands); and it seeks
nothing beyond itself (1177 a 12 - b 24).24
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The last o f these attributes calls for comment, necessarily brief. How can the divine kin
be thought
to seek no end beyond itself? By definition, it seeks the motion o f the first sphere (or the first-sphere-in-motion).
Something more can be said about this than was earlier said to explain the activity's reflexive structure. For we can
also draw on the argument of Section 3 showing how the sphere itself exists only m dependence on the Mover . The
Mover, then, is at one with the sphere since the latter lacks separate existence. The Prime Mover is the substance
o f the sphere and its motion (though not in such a way as to be subject, itself, of predicates like 'revolving' andÿfast').
This should remind us o f the way in which, as Aristotle says, the human intellect is one with its objects, so that it
would be false to say that in thinking them it relates to something different from itself.25 But this holds o f the human
intellect only when it contemplates essences in abstraction from matter and physical particulars (cf. DA 430 a 2-9;
Meta. 1074 b 38 - 1075 a 5). Otherwise, as in practical and productive human thinking, the objects o f intellect also
lead independent lives in the world o f nature where they are able to be concretely more than whatever they are for
the intellect. So for human beings, contemplation alone is wholly at one with its objects. A version o f godlike
independence is indeed possible for us, but only if we abstract ourselves and our thoughts from changing sensible
things. This is because so far as we do connect with the natural order, we connect through being within it and subject
to its alien influences. But the Prime Mover's connection with nature is utterly different. The Cause o f the world
is set in no physical environment from which it must withdraw in order to exercise its complete noetic freedom. That
is why the divine reality, unlike ours, can sustain itself in its full perfection without being severed from the world in
contemplation.26'27

NQ
IE.S
1. Phys. VIII, M A. DC (except for 292 a 18 - b 25, on which see note 2).
2. I do not claim that Aristotle never held a view of this kind. Something like it appears at D £ 292 a 18 - b 25. But
there are notable differences between this and the position (however we interpret it) in Lambda, viz: (a) the théiotatë
arche of the E C passage is clearly not an efficient cause, whereas the Prime Mover in Lambda seems (and, I would
argue, is; see note 4) efficient as well as final, (b) Although the health analogy suggests that the arche is the final (or
possibly exemplary) cause of the celestial motions, this is not actually stated, (c) The relations between the heavenly
bodies and the arche are explained in terms of distance (spatial, but presumably also metaphysical), and nothing is said
of love or desire, (d) The context shows that Aristotle is not, as in Lambda, trying to account for eternal motion in
the universe, but to explain why the motions of the planets are more complicated than those o f sun, moon, and fixed
stars. A unitary explanation must relate these diverse motions to a single principle, but (because of the diversity) the
single principle cannot be an efficient cause, hence must be vaguely conceived as final or exemplary. One has the
impression in D £ that as long as Aristotle is considering the motion of the fixed stars or first heaven alone, he is
happy to account for it entirely in terms of an internal efficient causal principle (either a "nature" or an in-dwelling
divinity). Mention should also be made of ΠΑ 415 a 26 ff.,
336 b 25 ff. and Q A 731 b 24 ff., since it is often
claimed that they refer to something like the Prime Mover theory of Lambda (according to the usual interpretation
o f this). But in these passages Aristotle is not concerned with the motion of the first heaven. Participation in, or
imitation of, the divine principle is invoked to explain the reproduction of species whose members are mortal. (Again,
at Meta. 1050 b 28 inanimate perishable bodies are said to imitate the eternal.) There is nothing here to suggest that
the motion of the immortal heaven must be explained as imitatio dei. (In fact, these passages can be taken as implying
[or stating: cf. G £ 337 a 3-4] that the object of imitation [or participation] is either the heavenly motion itself or a
divine efficient-causal activity of producing it. Such a theory may be awkward to reconcile with the usual
interpretation o f Lambda, since whatever has the status of object of imitation can hardly be explained as the result of
imitation itself.)
3. This is essentially Ross' interpretation (Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924), vol. I, pp. cxxx ff.), although
Ross hesitates to deny that the Prime Mover is efficient cause. But this is not so much because Ross thinks; that
the Mover must be efficient as because he sees that its actual existence is not guaranteed by its rôle as final cause.
4. (a) The argument at 1072 b 30 ff. against the Pythagoreans and Speusippus is ineffectual unless 'to kalliston kai
aristón' at 32 refers to the efficient cause, (b) 1073 a 5 ff. quotes Phvs. VIII.10 for the argument that die Prime
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4. Mover has no magnitude. In the Physics the Prime Mover is an efficient cause, and it would be senseless to apply
that argument to anything but an efficient cause, (c) The stratëgos in the analogy in Ch. 10 is an efficient cause, (d)
At 1073 a 25-30 the internal a&usativés ('kinësin' and, by implication, 'phoran') suggest efficient causation. So does
the preposition 'hupo' (carefully aligned with agency at Phys. 202 b 21-22).
5. In any event, the soul o f the first sphere has noesis. since the orekton is noëton (1072 a 26-30). Hence it follows
from thé usual view that two intellects (not merely two spirituál beings) are required to account for the primary
motion. But at 1074 a 14-16 Aristotle clearly implies that the number of eternally active intelligences is the same as
the number o f celestial spheres, i.e. 54 plus 1 (die first sphere). That gives 55 intelligences, but on the usual view
there should be 56.
6. 'That-for-the-sake-of-which' may have the sense of 'exemplar' at DC 292 a 21 - b 26 (at least, so the argument
requires). Cf. D A 415 b 1, where W.'Kullihann ('Different Concepts of the Final Causé in Aristotle', in Aristotle
on Nature and Living Things, ed. A. Gotthelf [Pittsburgh, 1985], pp. 169-75), detects the exemplary sense. But
this is not required unless 'ekeinou' refers to God, and it is just as naturally taken to refer to participation in
what is godlike and eternal.
7. It is no use replying that the potentiality for imitative activity must on Aristotelian principles be metaphysically
posterior to a corresponding actuality. This does not entail that there must be an actual God to be imitated, but
only that there must at any time be an actual imitator.
8. If it is too dumb to appreciate the Value of its own (otherwise) supremely good activity, it is not absolutely
perfect; but the model theory does not require it to be.
9. This can be taken in at least three senseS: (i) the activity of thinking involves an awareness o f itself; (ii) the
thinking has some kihd o f intellectual activity as its object or objective; (iii) the object(s) o f thought are at one
with the thinking, hence the thinking o f them is not a thinking of something other than itself, (i) and (ii) are
relevant to the argument o f Section 3; (iii) will be relevant at the end o f Section 4. (On a fourth, but questionable,
sense, see note 26.)
10. The concept o f God appears in Lambda only because the attributes demonstrated for the Prime Mover
(perfect noetic activity, consequently pleasure, and consequently life) are those which we ascribe to God (cf. 1072
b 23-30, and note 21 below).
11. This objection assumés that although the object of desire is a cause o f intellectual movement ( = desire),
this is not in general true o f objects o f intellect. Otherwise even a purely contemplative Mover would be
intellectually moved by its object o f contemplation. Again, the objection must assume that the contemplator does
not desire or value its own contemplation, since that would import movement into the Prime Mover.
12. Thus in D A ΠΙ.9-10 (up to 433 b 3, which begins a discussion of the good), desire figures as a first mover
and is not said to be either a movement or in movement. At 433 b L0 ff. the perspective shifts; the first mover
is said to be the object desired, and desire is now said to be a movement.
13. I owe this observation to Richard McKirahan.
14. It may be said: 'for Aristotle, if this principle of locomotion is psychic at all, it must be intellectual or sensory;
and it cannot be sensory, since "sensory" entails sénse organs affected by an environment'. This is too mechanical
to be a satisfactory explanation. It was Aristotle (not some Higher Authority) who laid down the division invoked
here, and no one is more adept than Aristotle iii stretching existing concepts for the sake of a theoretical advance.
If he had had no positive reason for holding the cèlestial principle to be an intellect, he could surely have found a way
to avoid representing it as rational without being committed to endowing it with sense organs. (Would he not say,
e.gv, that non-rationâl animals desire to live, and if so would he think that the desire itself, as distinct from various
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actions taken accordingly, involves the exercise of sense organs?)
15. Since 'ergöi' at 1072 a 22 means ’to observation’, the remark refers only to the circularity o f the motion, not its
eternity. See 1075 a 5-10, which seems to make the point that just as a human good might need a finite period of time
in which to exist (so that the good aimed at would be had only in the whole time, not in this or that portion of it), in
the same way the good aimed at by the Prime Mover needs an eternity in which to occur.
16. This was the conclusion I reached in S. Waterlow, Nature. Change and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics (Oxford,
1988 [2nd ed]), pp. 260-61.
17. Cf. Phvs. 250 b 11-15 on eternal motion as the life o f the natural order. See also Theophrastus, Metaphysics
6 a 5-14.
18. There could not be the Mover (qua Mover) without the sphere, just as there cannot be a cause without its effect.
But the Mover is not on that account dependent on the sphere, as if the existence o f the sphere were a precondition
of its operation.
19. This discussion does not assume that the composition of EN X preceded that o f Lambda, only that the writer of
Lambda was familiar with the doctrines of EN X.
20. This is clearly registered by Ross, who interprets the divine activity as contemplation; thus he translates ’theöria’
at 24 as ’act of contemplation’ (my emphasis). See The Complete Works o f Aristotle. Revised Oxford Translation
(Princeton, 1984), p. 1695, and Ross's note in Aristotle’s Metaphysics ad loc. For ’theôrein’ used o f practical
thought, cf. EN 1146 b 31-35 (see A.R. Mele, 'Aristotle on Akrasia and Knowledge', The Modem Schoolman 58,
1981, and S. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York, 1991), pp. 295-96 and 310, note 25).
21. It may be thought that the EN premiss (SI), 'God does nothing but contemplate' plus the Lambda premiss (S2),
’The Prime Mover is God' provides Lambda with the conclusion (S3), 'The Prime Mover’s activity is contemplation'.
But this reverses the order o f argument in Lambda, where the divinity of the Prime Mover is deduced from what it
is about the Prime Mover in virtue of which he or it is Prime Mover (i.e., perfect actuality; see esp. 1072 b 23 with
Ross's note). Going in this direction, one might conclude to SI from S2, given independent reason for holding that
the Prime Mover is, qua contemplator, cause of motion.
22. It is worth pointing out that if one goes to the Ethics in search of support for the received interpretation
o f the Prime Mover theory in Lambda, then one should look for evidence that theöria in the Ethics stands to
good praxis as its exemplary cause. But there is no sign of such a theory, according to which the excellence of
a praxis would depend on its degree of similarity to contemplation. Good praxis does, o f course, resemble
theöria. in that both are stable, self-sufficient, pleasant etc. activities. Consequently, each (in its place) is
identified with eudaimonia. since those are the characteristics that qualify it for identification. Thus the
resemblance is due to this common relation to eudaimonia. not to any direct imitation of theöria by praxis.
23. Aristotle may have suspected an etymological connection between 'theos' and 'theöria'. Or/and 'theöria.
in the sense of 'contemplation' may have come to stand not merely for intellectual activity in general, but for selfsufficient intellectual activity in general, since contemplation is the best paradigm of this in the human context. The
shift in meaning would be encouraged by conceptual links between self-sufficiency and activity. (The supreme
instances of activity, in which there is only activity.and no independent capacity, are possible only if they are entirely
self-sufficient.)
24. Meta. 982 b 24 - 983 a 11 (a passage very similar to EN 1178 b 7-22) adds nothing to the case for interpreting
the Prime Mover in Lambda as contemplative. Here Aristotle recommends the study of first philosophy as a divine
sort o f knowledge, on the grounds (a) that unlike other forms of human knowledge, it is pursued for its own sake
alone, and (b) that God is its object. On both grounds it is said to be the sort of knowledge (tën toiautën. 983 a 9) that
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God would have. Notice that these divine characteristics belong, indifferently, to human first philosophy (which is
contemplative since it treats its objects as necessarily there independently) and to the Prime Mover's practical or
kinetic knowledge o f the eternal motion and his own generative activity. Though the activity is world-making, it is
not productive in the sense o f producing an article that could possibly exist without it. See also Pol. 1326 14-30,
where Aristotle argues that contemplation should count as a praxis, on the ground that a praxis need not be outwardly
directed. To show that self-contained praxis can be good, he cites God, the universe, and the activities of a city
deliberately founded in a remote place.
25. So is the moving heaven "in" the Prime Mover's mind? There might be reason for saying so, but it does not
yield a species o f Berkeleian idealism. Sublunary substances exist within the heaven, and they, it would seem,
are not noetic objects for the Prime Mover. Hence beings that are not in the Mover’s intellect are in, with a
different sense o f 'in', what is. On both senses, cf. Phys. 210 a 21-24.
26. The history o f how the Prime Mover in Lambda came to be regarded as contemplative, is a matter for further
study. There is also the question of how the view remains so influential. It is extraordinary that modern scholars are
not more puzzled by the absence o f God as contemplator from Theophrastus' Metaphysics, an all but contemporary
work which focuses on some version of Lambda. (The version in question may have lacked our present ch. 8, as has
been argued by D. Frede, "Theophrasts Kritik am unbewegten Beweger des Aristoteles", Phronesis XVI (1971). But
this does not affect the point, since the passages seeming to indicate a divine contemplator occur in Lambda 7 and 9).
It is remarkable that at 6 a 1-2 Theophrastus writes as if the author of Lambda assumes that God wills the disposition
o f the universe. Ross notes the discrepancy with the standard (= his own) view, and dismisses the lines as 'curiously
inconsequent' (Theophrastus Metaphysics, text with translation, commentary and introduction by W. D. Ross and F.
H. Fobes, Chicago, p. 48, 1978. For a more considered treatment, see M. van Raalte, Theophrastus. Metaphysics,
with Introduction. Translation and Commentary. Leiden, 1993, pp. 236 ff.) No doubt the equation of the Prime
M over's activity with contemplation has been fostered by a long standing (though possibly not ancient: see R.
Norman, 'Aristotle's Philosopher God', Phronesis XIV, 1969, especially pp. 72-3) construal o f the divine self
thinking. According to this, the divine thinking is not merely self-aware and self-valuing, but is exclusively about
itself, or takes only itself as its object. In that case, the Prime Mover cannot stand in noetic relation to anything
physical. However, nothing in Aristotle's text compels this reading. (On the history of this interpretation o f divine
self-thinking, see also J. Kraye, 'Aristotle's God and the authenticity of De Mundo: An Early Modern Controversy’,
Journal of the History o f Philosophy 28, 1990, especially note 3.)
27. This paper, which was first delivered at the Princeton Colloquium for Classical Philosophy in December
1990, has appeared (translated into French by J. Brunschwig) in Revue Philosophique. 1993. I am grateful to
colloquium participants at Princeton for their responses, and especially to Richard McKirahan, who commented
on the paper. I also wish to thank SAGP's administration for offering me the present opportunity for further
discussion.
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